Abstract. Group signatures allow members of a group to anonymously sign messages in the name of this group. They typically involve an opening authority that can identify the origin of any signature if the need arises. In some applications, such a tracing capability can be excessively strong and it seems desirable to restrict the power of the authority. Sakai et al. recently suggested the notion of group signatures with messagedependent opening (GS-MDO), where the opening operation is made contingent on the knowledge of a trapdoor information -generated by a second authority -associated with the message. Sakai et al. showed that their primitive implies identity-based encryption (IBE). In the standard model, efficiently constructing such a system thus requires a structurepreserving IBE scheme, where the plaintext space is the source group G (rather than the target group GT ) of a bilinear map e : G × G → GT . Sakai et al. used a structure-preserving IBE which only provides bounded collusion-resistance. As a result, their GS-MDO construction only provides a weak form of anonymity where the maximal number of trapdoor queries is determined by the length of the group public key. In this paper, we construct the first fully collusion-resistant IBE scheme that encrypts messages in G. Using this construction, we obtain a GS-MDO system with logarithmic signature size (in the number N of group members) and prove its security in the standard model under simple assumptions.
Introduction
Group signatures are central anonymity-related primitives, suggested by Chaum and van Heyst [20] , which allow users to sign messages while hiding their identity within a population they belong to. They notably find applications in trusted computing platforms, auction protocols, anonymous subscription systems or in mechanisms for protecting the privacy of commuters in public transportation. To prevent users from abusing the system, group signatures usually involve an opening authority (OA) which is capable of identifying the signer using some trapdoor information. Although the opening authority can remain most frequently offline, group members have no privacy at all against this all powerful entity that can spy on all signature generations and identify the signer every time. To address this problem, Sakai et al. [35] advocated the design of a special kind of group signatures, called group signatures with message-dependent opening (GS-MDO), where restrictions are placed on the power of the OA. In the GS-MDO primitive, opening authorities cannot open any signature on their own. In order to open a signature on a message M , they need both their private key and a messagespecific trapdoor t M generated by a separate authority called admitter.
While the notion of group signatures dates back to Chaum and van Heyst [20] , truly scalable and secure solutions remained elusive until the construction put forth by Ateniese et al. [6] . For lack of well-understood definitions, the security of their scheme was analyzed w.r.t. a list of sometimes redundant properties. A suitable security model was studied later on by Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [7] in the setting of static groups, where previous properties were subsumed by two security notions named full anonymity and full traceability. The case of dynamically growing groups was independently considered by Bellare, Shi and Zhang [9] and Kiayias and Yung [29] .
During the last decade, a number of practical schemes were analyzed (e.g., [6, 29, 12, 32, 21] ) in the random oracle model [8] , which is known [18] to only provide heuristic arguments in terms of security. While theoretical standard model constructions were given under general assumptions [7, 9] , they were "only" proofs of concept. Viable constructions were suggested for the first time by Boyen and Waters [14, 15] and Groth [23, 24] who took advantage of breakthrough results [22, 25] in the construction of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) and witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proofs. The most efficient standard model realizations to date rely on the Groth-Sahai methodology [25] , which is tailored to specific languages involving elements in bilinear groups.
Group Signatures with Message-Dependent Opening. Traditional group signature models allow opening authorities to identify the originator of every single signature. As discussed by Sakai et al. [35] , it may be desirable to restrict this extremely high power in many real-life applications.
One way to address this problem is to use techniques from threshold cryptography and share the opening key among several distributed opening authorities (as considered in, e.g., [10] ) in such a way that none of these can individually open signatures and hurt the privacy of group members. While this approach may be sufficient in some applications, it requires the distributed openers to run a joint opening protocol whenever they want to trace a signature back to its source. In applications where many signatures on the same message have to be opened, this may become impractical. For example, suppose that group signatures are used to verify anonymous access rights to a parking or to enhance the privacy of users in public transportation systems: by issuing a group signature on a message consisting of the current date and time, users can demonstrate that they hold a valid credential and paid the subscription without being linkable to their previous rides. If a crime is committed, the police may want to find out who used a given metro line during a specific time interval. This requires a mechanism allowing for the opening of all signatures generated for a given date-time message and only those. Running a distributed opening protocol for each individual signature may be a bottleneck in this scenario. The same is true when group signatures are used in auction protocols: if group members are bidders who anonymously sign their bids, the threshold opening approach entails a communication cost proportional to the number of winners who offered the highest amount.
The above use cases motivated Sakai et al [35] to formalize the notion of group signatures with message-dependent opening (GS-MDO), which splits the role of the opening authority between two entities called opener and admitter. In order to identify the author of a signature on a message M , the opener needs both its opening key ok and a trapdoor t M generated by the admitter for the message M : the opening operation must be approved by the admitter, depending on the content of the message. Importantly, neither entity is powerful enough to open a signature by itself. A crucial difference with the aforementioned threshold opening approach is that, once a trapdoor t M has been released for a sensitive message M , the opener can trace all signatures on M without any further interaction with the admitter.
We believe this message-dependent opening property to be of interest even in the setting of a centralized opening authority. Indeed, it features a complementary property to that of traceable signatures [28] . These involve opening authorities which can release a user-specific trapdoor allowing anyone to trace all signatures issued by a misbehaving group member. The GS-MDO primitive is important when the tracing criterion is the signed message (which could contain keywords associated with an illegal transaction) instead of the group member's identity. Both techniques could actually be used in conjunction: one could first use a message-specific trapdoor to identify all group members who signed a suspicious message before tracing all other signatures created by these members.
Related Work. Sakai et al. [35] gave a general construction of GS-MDO and notably showed that it implies Identity-Based Encryption [36, 13] (IBE): in their specific construction, the trusted authority naturally serves as an admitter and message-specific trapdoors are nothing but IBE private keys associated with the message. They also pointed out that, in order to build an efficient GS-MDO system in the standard model with the current state of knowledge in the area, they need a form of structure-preserving IBE scheme. Recall that a cryptographic primitive is called structure-preserving (see [23, 19, 3, 1, 2, 17, 4] for examples) if it handles objects -like ciphertexts or signatures -that only consist of elements from a group G over which a bilinear map is efficiently computable and if the validity of these objects can be checked using pairing-product equations. The latter properties make the primitive compatible with the Groth-Sahai techniques [25] , which is crucial when one seeks to prove security in the standard model.
The main difficulty is that no structure-preserving IBE scheme is available to date: all pairing-based schemes proceed either by XORing the message with a hashed Bilinear Diffie-Hellman key [13] or encrypting messages that live in the target group G T of the bilinear map e : G × G → G T (see, e.g., [11, 37] ). In order to construct an efficient GS-MDO in the standard model, what we need is an IBE scheme that encrypts messages in the domain group G. We call such a system partially structure-preserving since identities do not have to be group elements and private keys can be ordinary (non-structure-preserving) signatures. For lack of a fully collusion-resistant such IBE, Sakai et al. [35] used a variant of the k-resilient construction of Heng and Kurosawa [27] : in the latter, semantic security is only guaranteed against adversaries that obtain private keys for no more than an a priori bounded number of identities. Moreover, the master public key has linear size in the pre-determined upper bound k. As a consequence, the standard model GS-MDO realization of [35] only achieves a relaxed flavor of security: namely, anonymity against the opener is only guaranteed as long as the adversary obtains trapdoors for at most k distinct messages. Moreover, the group public key inherits the O(k) size of the underlying IBE system.
In the random oracle model, Ohara et al. [33] recently proposed a construction allowing for an unbounded number of trapdoor queries. However, for the time being, building a fully secure GS-MDO system in the standard model remains an open problem.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we describe a GS-MDO system with O(log N ) size signatures, where N is the number of group members, and prove its security in the standard model under simple, constant-size assumptions (i.e., we do not use q-type assumptions where the number of input elements depends on the number of adversarial queries or other system-related parameters).
As a result of independent interest, we describe the first fully collusionresistant pairing-based IBE scheme that allows encrypting messages in the source group G. This property is useful when it comes to proving properties about IBE-encrypted data: for example, the techniques of Camenisch et al. [16] can be used in combination with Groth-Sahai proofs to provide evidence that an IBEencrypted plaintext belongs to a public set. Our system proceeds by blinding the plaintext M ∈ G using a random mask obtained by multiplying a random subset i∈S Z i of public elements (Z 1 , . . . , Z ) ∈ G , where is proportional to the security parameter. The -bit string K identifying the subset S (so that K[i] = 1 if and only if Z i ∈ S) is in turn encoded in a bit-wise manner using a variant of the Waters IBE scheme, each bit K[i] of K being encoded as an independent IBE ciphertext entirely comprised of elements in G. A consequence of this bit-by-bit encoding is that we need O( ) group elements to encrypt one element M ∈ G. Despite its relatively large ciphertext size, our construction suffices to provide O(log N ) size signatures.
If we naively plug our IBE scheme into the general GS-MDO construction of Sakai et al. [35] , we obtain signatures consisting of O(λ) group elements (or O(λ 2 ) bits), where λ is the security parameter, as each signature includes an IBE ciphertext. Fortunately, we can obtain signatures of only O(log N ) group elements -which is substantially shorter since log N λ for any group of polynomial cardinality N -by combining the bit-wise encoding of our IBE scheme with the technique used in the Boyen-Waters group signature [14] . In the latter, membership certificates consist of Waters signatures
on the group members' identifiers id ∈ {0, 1} , where = log N , and each group signature contains commitments to the individual bits id[j] of id as well as NIWI proofs showing that committed values are actually bits. Our idea is thus to encode each bit id[j] of id using a structure-preserving identity-based bit encryption scheme where the receiver's identity is the message to be signed. In order to guarantee anonymity against the admitter, we follow [35] and super-encrypt each IBE ciphertext under the opener's public key using a CCA2-secure publickey cryptosystem. For groups of N = 10 6 users, we eventually obtain signatures of 68 kB at the 128-bit security level, which is approximately twice the signature length of the k-resilient scheme of [35] .
Organization. In the forthcoming sections, we first recall the syntax and the security definitions of group signatures with message-dependent opening in Section 2. Section 3 describes our structure-preserving IBE system and our GS-MDO scheme is detailed in Section 4.
Background

Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumptions
We use bilinear maps e : G × G → G T over groups of prime order p where e(g, h) = 1 G T if and only if g, h = 1 G . In these groups, we rely on two hardness assumptions that are both non-interactive and stated using a constant number of elements.
The Decision Linear assumption is the intractability of DLIN for any PPT distinguisher.
Definition 2 ([13]). The Decision 3-party
Diffie-Hellman (D3DH) Prob- lem in G, is to distinguish the distributions (g, g a , g b , g c , g abc ) and (g, g a , g b , g c , g z ), where a, b, c, z R ← Z p .
Groth-Sahai Proof Systems
Groth-Sahai (GS) proofs [25] can be based on the DLIN assumption, where they use prime order groups and a common reference string containing three vectors
In the soundness setting, we have
where
, X · g r+s+t(ξ1+ξ2) ) are then extractable using β 1 = log g (f 1 ),
). In the witness indistinguishability (WI) setting, f 1 , f 2 , f 3 are linearly independent and C is a perfectly hiding commitment. Under the DLIN assumption, the two kinds of CRS are indistinguishable.
To commit to an exponent x ∈ Z p , the prover computes
where r, s R ← Z p , using a CRS consisting of vectors ϕ, f 1 , f 2 . In the perfect soundness setting, ϕ, f 1 , f 2 are linearly independent while, in the perfect WI setting,
gives a perfectly hiding commitment. To prove that committed variables satisfy a set of relations, the prover computes one commitment per variable and one proof element per relation. Such non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proofs are available for pairingproduct equations, which are equations of the form
for variables X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ G and constants t T ∈ G T , A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ G, a ij ∈ Z p , for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Efficient NIWI proofs also exist for multi-exponentiation equations, which are of the form
In pairing-product equations, proofs for quadratic equations require 9 group elements whereas linear equations (i.e., where a ij = 0 for all i, j in equation (1)) only cost 3 group elements each. Linear multi-exponentiation equations of the type
Group Signatures with Message-Dependent Opening
We use the syntax of [35] , which extends the static model of Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [7] .
Keygen(λ, N ): given a security parameter λ ∈ N and a maximal number of group members N ∈ N, this algorithm outputs a group public key gpk, a vector gsk = (gsk[0], . . . , gsk[N − 1]) of group members' private keys as well as private keys msk ADM and ok for the admitter and the opener. Sign: takes as input a message M , a private key gsk[i] and gpk, it outputs a signature σ. Verify: is a deterministic algorithm taking as input a signature σ, a message M and a group public key gpk. It returns either 0 or 1. TrapGen: is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes as input the admitter's private key msk ADM and a message M . It outputs a trapdoor t M allowing the OA to open all signatures on M . Open: takes as input a message M , a valid signature σ w.r.t. gpk, the opening authority's private key ok and a trapdoor t M for the message M . It outputs i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} ∪ {⊥}, which is either the index of a group member or a symbol indicating an opening failure.
Definition 3. A GS-MDO scheme provides full traceability if, for any λ ∈ N, any N ∈ poly(λ) and any PPT adversary A involved in the experiment hereafter, it holds that
Definition 4. A GS-MDO scheme provides full anonymity against the admitter if, for any λ ∈ N, any N ∈ poly(λ) and any PPT adversary A, the function
is a negligible function in the security parameter if the experiment proceeds as follows
In the above notation, O ok denotes an oracle that takes as input any adversarially chosen signature σ = σ and uses ok and msk ADM to determine and return the identity of the signer.
Definition 5. A GS-MDO scheme provides full anonymity against the opener if, for any λ ∈ N, any N ∈ poly(λ) and any PPT adversary A, the function
is a negligible function in the security parameter if the experiment goes as follows
In the above notation, O msk ADM (.) is an oracle that returns trapdoors for arbitrary messages M = M chosen by the adversary.
3 A Fully Collusion-Resistant Partially StructurePreserving IBE
Intuition
The scheme is only partially structure-preserving in that identities are still encoded as binary strings and private keys are ordinary signatures (recall that, in any IBE, private keys are signatures on the corresponding identity, as mentioned in [13] The idea is to include a vector (Z 1 , . . . , Z ) ∈ G in the master public key. The message M ∈ G will be encrypted by choosing a random -bit string K ∈ {0, 1} and multiplying M with a product of elements in the set S = {Z i | K[i] = 1}. Then, each bit K[i] of K will be individually encrypted using a variant of the Waters IBE. In the latter variant, an encryption of 1 will consist of a tuple
, where Although the latter scheme allows encrypting messages in the group G, it still does not provide all the properties we need for the problem at hand. When it comes to proving that a ciphertext encrypts a message that coincides with the content of Groth-Sahai commitment, the difficulty is to prove that the equality e(C i,3 , C i,4 ) = e(C i,1 , d 1 )/e(C i,2 , d 2 ) is not satisfied when K[i] = 0. For this reason, we need to modify the scheme as suggested in Section 3.2.
Construction
In order to be able to efficiently prove that a ciphertext and a Groth-Sahai commitment hide the same group element, we modify the scheme of Section 3.1 as follows. In the master public key, the element g 1 is replaced by a pair (g 0 , g 1 ) = (g α0 , g α1 ). The master secret key is twinned in the same way and now consists of (g α0 2 , g α1 2 ). Likewise, each identity is assigned a private key of the form
In the encryption algorithm, when the sender wants to "encrypt" a bit
so that the receiver can easily determine the value of K[i] using his private key.
The modification will make it easier to prove equalities between the plaintext and a committed value. The reason is that the prover does not have to prove an inequality when K[i] = 0: he essentially has to prove statements of the form
. Our construction of Groth-Sahai-compatible IBE thus goes follows.
Setup(λ)
The master secret key is msk := (g α0 2 , g α1 2 ) and the master public key is defined as
Keygen(msk, ID) : given the master secret key msk = (g 
Encrypt(mpk, ID, M ) : to encrypt a message M ∈ G, conduct the following steps. 
Otherwise, return ⊥.
Compute and return
).
Unlike the IBE system of Sakai et al. [35] , the above scheme provides full collusion-resistance and the size of the master public key only depends on the security parameter and not on a pre-determined bound on the number of corrupted users. Theorem 1. The above IBE scheme provides IND-ID-CPA security under the D3DH assumption.
Proof. We consider a sequence of games which begins with the real game and ends with a game where the adversary's view is independent of the challenger's bit β ∈ {0, 1}. For each i, we denote by S i the event that the adversary wins in Game i and we define the adversary's advantage as
Game 0: This is the real attack game where the challenger generates a proper encryption of M β , with β R ← {0, 1}, in the challenge phase. The game ends with the adversary A outputting β ∈ {0, 1} and we denote by S 0 the event that β = β.
In this game, the challenger generates the challenge ciphertext in a hybrid manner. Namely, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , }, the challenger generates the ciphertext components {(C j,1 , C j,2 , C j,3 , C j,4 )} as follows.
, it runs the normal encryption algorithm and sets
for randomly chosen s j , ω j R ← Z p .
Game + 1: This game is identical to Game with the difference that, in the challenge ciphertext, C 0 is chosen as a uniformly random C 0
For each j ∈ {1, . . . , }, Lemma 1 shows that Game j is computationally indistinguishable from Game j − 1 if the D3DH assumption holds.
In Game , the ciphertext components {(C j,1 , C j,2 , C j,3 , C j,4 )} j=1 are completely uncorrelated to the string
. For this reason, we argue that the adversary's view is statistically independent of M β . This is easily seen by observing that the Leftover Hash Lemma implies that the two distributions
are statistically close when > 2 log 2 (p). Consequently, Game is statistically close to Game + 1, where C 0 is replaced by a uniformly random group element in the challenge ciphertext. In the latter game, we have Pr[S +1 ] = 1/2 (and thus Adv +1 = 0) since the challenge ciphertext is independent of M β .
Lemma 1.
If the D3DH assumption holds, Game i is computationally indistinguishable from Game i − 1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , }. More precisely, if A runs in time t and has significantly different advantages in Game i and Game i − 1, then there exists a PPT algorithm B with running time t + O(ε −2 ln(ε
where η = 1/(4(L + 1)q) and q is the maximal number of private key queries.
(The proof is given in Appendix B.)
We note that the same idea can be applied to construct other partially structure-preserving primitives. For example, it can be applied to selectivelysecure attribute-based encryption schemes based on the Decision Bilinear DiffieHellman assumption [34] .
Proving Properties about Encrypted Messages
Our solution retains the useful property of the scheme in [35] as it allows efficiently proving relations about the plaintext using the Groth-Sahai techniques.
M ∈ G which is also encrypted with the above IBE, the sender can proceed as follows to prove the equality between the committed message and the plaintext. For each i, the sender computes
. This is typically achieved by proving the equality
consisting of 9 group elements. Next, the sender generates a commitment C Gi to the group element G i = g K[i] and generates a non-interactive proof π Gi that committed elements G i and
The latter is a linear equation for which the proof π Gi requires three group elements. Then, the sender generates a commitment C Θi to the auxiliary variable
and generate non-interactive proofs π Θi,1 , π Θi,2 for the relations
Since the first equation of (3) is linear equation, π Θi,1 only requires 3 group elements. On the other hand, the second equation is quadratic, so that π Θi,2 costs 9 group elements to prove. Finally, the sender is left with proving that e(C 0 /M, g) = i=1 e(Z i , K i ), which is a linear equation whose proof π C0 requires 3 group elements.
The whole NIWI proof
, π C0 thus takes 35 + 3 group elements overall.
In some cases, the above proof might have to be a NIZK (and not just NIWI) proof. In pairing-product equations, NIZK proofs are not known to always exist. Fortunately, we can solve this issue by introducing a constant number of extra variables, as we will see in Section 4.
A Fully Anonymous GS-MDO Scheme with Logarithmic-Size Signatures
Our construction departs from the general approach suggested in [35] in order to obtain shorter signatures. The signing algorithm of [35] proceeds by choosing two random session keys K P KE and K IBE which are separately encrypted using a CCA2-secure public-key encryption scheme and an IBE scheme, respectively. These two keys K P KE and K IBE are then used to hide the group member's credential in the fashion of nested multiple encryptions while adding a proof that the hidden value is a valid and properly encrypted credential. If we naively apply this approach using our IBE scheme, we will eventually obtain signatures consisting of O(λ 2 ) bits, where λ is the security parameter. To reduce the signature size to O(λ log N ) bits (recall that log N λ since the cardinality N of the group is assumed to be polynomial), we use a different approach. Instead of encrypting random session keys which conceal the group member's credential under two randomly generated session keys, we directly encrypt the bits of the group member's identity as if it were the session key K in the IBE scheme of Section 3.2. This allows reducing the number of bit-carrying IBE ciphertext components from O(λ) to O(log N ). In order to make sure that neither the admitter or the opening authority will be able to individually open any signature, we add a second encryption layer and additionally encrypt -under the admitter's public key using Kiltz's DLIN-based CCA2-secure encryption scheme [31] -the IBE ciphertext components which depend on the bits of the group member's identity.
The rest of the signing algorithm proceeds as in the Boyen-Waters group signature [14] , by having the signer verifiably encrypt a two-level hierarchical signature [30] , where the first-level (resp. second-level) message is the signer's identity (resp. the actual message). Like [14] , we use a two-level hierarchical extension of Waters' signature [37].
Construction
Keygen(λ, N ): given a security parameter λ ∈ N and N = 2 , 1. Choose bilinear groups (G, G T ) of prime order p > 2 λ , with g R ← G.
As a CRS for the Groth-Sahai proof system, select vectors
, where
We also define the vector ϕ = f 3 · (1, 1, g ). 3. Generate a master key pair (msk IBE , mpk IBE ) for the identity-based key encapsulation scheme of Section 3.2
1 Note that the {Zi} i=1 components are not needed here and can be discarded.
where L ∈ poly(λ) denotes the length of (hashed) messages to be signed. For a message M ∈ {0, 1} L , we define the function H U (M ) ∈ G as
, where M [i] ∈ {0, 1} denotes the i-th bit of M . 4. Generate a key pair (sk W , pk W ) for a two-level hierarchical Waters signature. At level 1 (resp. level 2), messages will be of length (resp. L). This key pair consists of sk W = g ω and
where ω ∈ R Z p . Analogously to step 3, we denote by H W (M ) the function that maps the message M ∈ {0, 
, 1} which is obtained as the binary expansion of i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. The private key sk W = g ω is not needed beyond this point and can be erased after the generation of the vector of private keys gsk = (gsk[0], . . . , gsk[N − 1]). 6. Generate a public key (X, Y, U, V ) = (g βx , g βy , g βu , g βv ), with random β x , β y , β u , β v R ← Z p , for Kiltz's CCA2-secure encryption scheme. 7. Select a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme Σ = (G, S, V).
The admitter's message specification key consists of msk ADM := msk IBE . The private key ok of the opening authority is defined as ok := (β x , β y , β u , β v ). The private key of member i is gsk[i] while the group public key is be
L using the i-th group member's private key
r , g r , generate a one-time signature key pair (SK, VK) ← Σ.G(λ) and do the following.
1. Generate a two-level Waters signature where the message is id i ∈ {0, 1} at the first level and M ∈ {0, 1} L at level 2. The signature consists of
where r = r + r .
Generate a commitment
Since (4) 
Then, encrypt C j,3 using Kiltz's encryption scheme, by randomly choosing z j,1 , z j,2 R ← Z p and computing
The next step will be to prove that the ciphertexts {Ψ j } j=1 encrypt {C j,3 } j=1 such that {(C j,1 , C j,2 , C j,3 , C j,4 )} j=1 are of the form (5) with id i [j] ∈ {0, 1}. 4. To generate NIZK proofs for the next statements, generate commitments
as well as C Γ1 and C Γ2 to the variables
and a non-interactive proof π Γ for the three equalities (6), which requires 9 group elements (3 for each equation). Then, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , }, generate Groth-Sahai commitments C Gj , C Θj , C zj,1 , C zj,2 to the variables
for the relations e(F j , F j ) = e(g, F j )
e(G j , g) = e(g 1 , F j ) · e(g 0 , F
e(Ψ j,1 , g) = e(X, Z j,1 ) (10)
This is done by proving that
e(Θ j , C j,4 ) = e(C j,1 , Γ 2 ) (15)
Note that relation (7) guarantees that each id i [j] is indeed a bit. Relations (13) and (18) are quadratic equation and thus require 9 elements each whereas 12 elements suffice for relations (14)- (17) . Note that the same variable θ ∈ Z p can be re-used for each j ∈ {1, . . . , }, so that (6) only needs to be proved once. 5. Generate a commitment C Ω1 to Ω 1 with a NIWI proof π W ∈ G 3 that variables (Ω 1 , H V ) satisfy the verification equation
of the two-level Waters signature. 6. Finally, use SK to generate a one-time signature σ ots on the entire set of commitments and NIWI/NIZK proofs in order to achieve anonymity in the CCA2 sense. The whole signature σ consists of 
Open(gpk, ok, t M , M, σ): return ⊥ if σ is not a valid group signature w.r.t. gpk and M . Otherwise, parse t M as in (20) . For i = 1 to , do the following. Return the identifier id = id [1] . . . id[ ] ∈ {0, 1} .
Overall, each signature consists of 53 + 35 group elements if the scheme is instantiated with Groth's discrete-logarithm-based one-time signature [23] . For groups of N ≈ 10 6 members (which can accommodate the population of a city), we can set = 20 and obtain signatures of 68 kB at the 128-bit security level assuming that each group element has a 512-bit representation. In comparison, the k-resilient system of Sakai et al. [35] already requires signatures of 32 kB for the same security level. While less efficient than the random-oracle-based realization of [33] , our scheme is not unrealistically expensive for practical applications.
Security
The traceability of the scheme relies on the standard CDH assumption whereas the anonymity properties rely on the D3DH and DLIN assumptions. In the proof of anonymity against the admitter, we also need to assume that the one-time signature is strongly unforgeable [5] , which is implied by the DLIN assumption in Groth's scheme [23] . Since the CDH assumption is implied by both D3DH and DLIN, we only need two assumptions to prove the following result (as detailed in the full version of the paper).
Theorem 2. The scheme provides full traceability as well as full anonymity against the opener and the admitter assuming that: (i) Σ is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature; (ii) The DLIN and D3DH assumption both hold in G. A Definitions for Identity-Based Encryption Definition 6 ([13] ). An IBE scheme consists of a tuple of efficient algorithms (Setup, Keygen, Encrypt, Decrypt) such that:
-Setup takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ N and outputs a master public key mpk and a matching master secret key msk. -Keygen takes as input an identity ID and a master secret key msk. It outputs a private key d ID for the identity ID. -Encrypt takes as input the master public key mpk, an identity ID and a message m and outputs a ciphertext C. -Decrypt takes as input the master public key mpk, a decryption key d ID and a ciphertext C and outputs a message M .
Correctness requires that, for any λ ∈ N, any outputs (mpk, msk) of Setup(λ), any plaintext M and any identity ID,
The standard security notion captures the semantic security of messages encrypted under some identity, even when the adversary has corrupted polynomiallymany other identities. In k-resilient IBE schemes [27] , the adversary is restricted to make private key extraction queries on at most k distinct identities. In this paper, we consider the standard definition where the maximal number of private key queries is not fixed in advance.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let us assume that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , } for which a PPT adversary A can tell Game i apart from Game i − 1. We show how to build an algorithm B that takes in an instance (g, g a , g b , g c , T ) of the D3DH problem and uses its interaction with A to decide if T = g abc or T ∈ R G. To this end, algorithm B prepares the master public key mpk by randomly choosing γ 0 , γ 1 R ← Z p and setting g 0 = (g a ) γ0 , g 1 = (g a ) γ1 as well as g 2 = g b . Note that this implicitly defines α 0 = a · γ 0 and α 1 = a · γ 
so that any L-bit identity ID = ID [1] . . . ID[L] ∈ {0, 1} L has a hash value
that can be written H G (ID) = g J2(ID) · (g b ) J1(ID) if we define the functions
The generation of mpk is completed by having B choose Z 1 , . . . , Z R ← G at random.
Whenever A queries an identity ID for private key extraction, B uses the same strategy as in the security proofs of [11, 37] . Namely, it first evaluates the function J 1 (ID). If J 1 (ID) = 0, it aborts and outputs a random bit. Otherwise, it chooses r 0 , r 1 When A decides to enter the challenge phase, it chooses messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ G and a target identity ID . At this point, B aborts and outputs a random bit in the event that J 1 (ID ) = 0. Otherwise (i.e., if J 1 (ID ) = 0), B chooses a bit β R ← {0, 1} as well as a random -bit string K R ← {0, 1} and generates the challenge ciphertext as follows.
-For each j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}, B chooses s j , ω j R ← Z p ,C j,3 ,C j,4 R ← G at random and sets (C j,1 , C j,2 , C j,3 , C j,4 ) = g sj , H G (ID) sj ,C j,3 ,C j,4 .
